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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
 Ronald Scott Eddington appeals from the district court’s order summarily 
dismissing all the claims in his petition for post-conviction relief. 
 
Statement Of Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
 
 As set forth in the Presentence Report (“PSI”), the underlying facts of 
Eddington’s criminal convictions are as follows: 
In summary, on 8/9/13 at approximately 0418 hours, Meridian Police 
Officers were dispatched regarding an assault with a deadly weapon.  
Once at her residence, Cpl. Ford made contact with Clarence Belue who 
reported his ex-son-in-law had tried to kill his daughter, Carrie Eddington. 
Ms. Eddington was crying and was extremely upset.  She said her ex-
husband Ronald Eddington broke into her house and held her at gun point 
stating he was going to kill her.  
Ms. Eddington stated she was awoken when her bedroom light came on 
at approximately 0230 to 0300 hours.  She saw her ex-husband standing 
to the side of her bed holding a gun that was black and silver.  She 
reported Mr. Eddington told her he was going to kill her and then kill 
himself.  She pleaded and begged him not to kill her stating the children 
needed both of them alive. 
Ms. Eddington indicated she was so afraid she began talking to Mr. 
Eddington telling him things she felt he wanted to hear.  He told her he 
was upset because she would not talk to him or answer his e-mails and 
text messages. He said he was there to "end it all." 
During their conversation, Ms. Eddington noted Mr. Eddington pointed the 
gun at her several times. He would go from pointing the gun at her to 
pointing it at himself. He told her he was going to shoot her but not to 
worry because she would not feel pain because the bullets he chose were 
hollow and she would die instantly and not feel any pain. 
Ms. Eddington paced back and forth stating she could not believe she was 
alive.  She feared Mr. Eddington was going to kill her and himself and 
possibly his current pregnant wife.  She was so upset she was unable to 
provide a written statement.  She reported telling Mr. Eddington he could 
have full custody of their children and allowed him to kiss her several 
times on the cheek to keep him calm.  She stated she was not sure how 
she did it but she convinced him to leave the house and not kill her. 
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Ms. Eddington believed Mr. Eddington had been at her house for about an 
hour.  When he left, she told him to text her and let her know he made it 
home safe because she wanted to insure he actually left.  He told her if he 
left she had to promise not to call the police.  At 0355 hours, she received 
a text message from her ex-husband stating he was back home. 
After Ms. Eddington received the text from her ex-husband, she reported 
she was afraid to call the police fearing if he found out he would kill their 3 
children and kill her.  She laid in bed but was afraid Mr. Eddington would 
return and kill her.  She called her father who then called the police. 
(PSI, p.3.)1 
 
  The state charged Eddington with second degree kidnapping, burglary, 
aggravated assault, and with using a deadly weapon in the commission of a felony.  (R., 
p.62.)  Pursuant to a plea agreement, Eddington pled guilty to second degree 
kidnapping and aggravated assault, and the two other charges were dismissed. (See 
generally 1/16/14 Tr.)  The district court sentenced Eddington to a unified term of 22 
years with ten years fixed for second degree kidnapping, and a concurrent unified term 
of five years with five years fixed for aggravated assault.  (R., pp.58-61.)  Eddington 
filed a Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence (R., p.64), which was denied (R., p.65).  
Although Eddington filed a notice of appeal (R., p.64), he subsequently withdrew his 
appeal (R., pp.65, 331). 
 According to the district court, Eddington pursued post-conviction relief as 
follows, with bracketed references to the record: 
 The Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief was filed on 
September 15, 2015.  [R., pp.6-57.]  Petitioner stated eight bases for relief 
sought.  [Id.]  Seven are based on ineffective assistance of counsel, and 
the eighth is based on the trial court’s failure, “to perform any conflict of 
interest inquiry when it was introduced that Mr. Bartlett would be 
                                                          
1   The state has filed a pending motion to augment the appellate record with the PSI.  
The post-conviction court took judicial notice of the PSI in an Order filed January 20, 
2016.  (R., pp.316-317.) 
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representing both [Petitioner] and Diana [Petitioner’s mother] on related 
criminal charges.”  [R., p.7.] 
 
 Respondent State of Idaho filed a Motion for Summary Dismissal of 
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief on January 8, 2016.  [R., pp.265-294.] 
No supporting affidavit was filed, and the memorandum of points and 
authorities was combined with the motion.  [Id.]  Petitioner filed responsive 
briefing, with supporting affidavit, on January 20, 2016.  [R., pp.295-312.]  
The same day, the Court entered an order taking judicial notice of certain 
portions of the underlying criminal record, including the presentence 
report, the guilty plea form entered January 16, 2014, and the Indictment 
filed August. [sic] 20, 2013.  [R., pp.316-329.] 
 
 No reply briefing was filed, and therefore the Court has considered 
such briefing waived.  Petitioner withdrew the appeal he initially filed so 
there is not [sic] completed or ongoing appeal at this point. 
 
(R., p.331 (footnotes omitted).) Explaining that no party had noticed the matter for a 
hearing, the district court declined to hear arguments on the state’s motion for summary 
dismissal and, based on the pleadings and briefs submitted, entered a Memorandum 
Decision and Order Granting Summary Dismissal and a Final Judgment.  (R., pp.330-
346, 355-356.)  Eddington filed a timely notice of appeal.  (R., pp.350-354.)   
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ISSUES 
 Eddington presents the following issues on appeal: 
A. The district court erred in granting summary dismissal of Mr. 
Eddington’s claims of ineffective assistance of counsel cited in his petition 
for post-conviction relief. 
 
B.  The district court should have granted Mr. Eddington the relief he 
was seeking pursuant to a summary disposition under I.C. § 19-4906(c). 
 
C. The district court abused its discretion in failing to grant an 
evidentiary hearing on the claims cited in Mr. Eddington’s petition for post-
conviction relief.   
 
(Appellant’s Brief, pp.9-10 (capitalization modified).)   
 The state phrases the issue on appeal as: 
Has Eddington failed to establish error in the summary dismissal of his petition 
for post-conviction relief?     
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ARGUMENT 
 
Eddington Has Failed To Show Error In The Summary Dismissal Of His Post-Conviction 
Petition 
 
A. Introduction 
 
 On appeal, Eddington challenges the district court’s order granting the state’s 
motion for summary dismissal of his post-conviction claims.  (See generally Appellant’s 
Brief.)  Eddington has failed to establish the district court erred in summarily dismissing 
his petition.       
B. Standard Of Review 
 “On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an 
evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of material fact 
exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits 
on file.”  Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803 (2007) (citing Gilpin-
Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 80, 57 P.3d 787, 791 (2002)).   
 
C. Eddington Has Failed To Establish Any Error In The District Court’s Summary 
Dismissal Of His Post-Conviction Petition 
 Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of an application for post-
conviction relief in response to a party’s motion or on the court’s own initiative.  “To 
withstand summary dismissal, a post-conviction applicant must present evidence 
establishing a prima facie case as to each element of the claims upon which the 
applicant bears the burden of proof.”  State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 72, 90 P.3d 278, 
297 (2003) (citing Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 583, 6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000)).  Thus, a 
claim for post-conviction relief is subject to summary dismissal pursuant to I.C. § 19-
4906 “if the applicant’s evidence raises no genuine issue of material fact” as to each 
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element of petitioner’s claims.  Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing I.C. 
§ 19-4906(b), (c)); Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 72, 90 P.3d at 297.   
 While a court must accept a petitioner’s unrebutted allegations as true, the court 
is not required to accept either the applicant’s mere conclusory allegations, unsupported 
by admissible evidence, or the applicant’s conclusions of law.  Workman, 144 Idaho at 
522, 164 P.3d at 802 (citing Ferrier v. State, 135 Idaho 797, 799, 25 P.3d 110, 112 
(2001)).  If the alleged facts, even if true, would not entitle the petitioner to relief, the trial 
court is not required to conduct an evidentiary hearing prior to dismissing the petition.  
Id. (citing Stuart v. State, 118 Idaho 865, 869, 801 P.2d 1216, 1220 (1990)).  
“Allegations contained in the application are insufficient for the granting of relief when 
(1) they are clearly disproved by the record of the original proceedings, or (2) do not 
justify relief as a matter of law.”  Id. 
 In its Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Summary Dismissal (R., 
pp.330-346), the district court articulates the applicable legal standards and sets forth, 
in detail, the reasons Eddington failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact on 
any of his claims.  The state fully adopts the analysis and reasoning in the district 
court’s Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Summary Dismissal as its basis for 
affirming the summary dismissal of Eddington’s post-conviction claims, and incorporates 
that Decision and Order (attached as Appendix A) into this brief as if fully set forth 
herein.  In addition to the district court's reasoning for granting the state’s motion for 
summary dismissal, the state makes the following arguments and comments in regard 
to the summary dismissal of several of Eddington’s claims. 
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1. Trial Counsel’s Failure To Present Favorable Testimony And Mitigating 
Mental Health Evidence At The Sentencing Hearing 
 
 In summarily dismissing Eddington’s claim that his trial counsel was ineffective 
“by refusing to permit favorable witnesses to testify on [his] behalf at the sentencing 
hearing or present sufficient mitigating evidence of [his] longstanding mental health 
challenges”2 (R., p.28), the district court explained: 
  In sum, Petitioner received this sentence because of the 
seriousness of the crime.  There is not a reasonable probability, even 
assuming that trial counsel had done what Petitioner now says he should 
have done, that the sentence he received would have been any more 
lenient.  Further, each of these actions is within the range of tactical 
decisions allowable by defense counsel in a criminal case.  Petitioner has 
failed to establish that these actions are impermissible as a matter of law.  
Thus, Petitioner has failed to establish any issue of fact as to whether the 
sentence would have been different had counsel acted as Petitioner 
believes counsel should have, or that counsel acted outside of the range 
of permitted conduct.   
    
(R., p.345 (footnote omitted).)   
To further buttress the district court’s summary dismissal of Eddington’s claim, it 
should be noted that five of the seven persons he contends his trial counsel should 
have called as witnesses at the sentencing hearing – Roxie Davidson, Ronald 
Eddington, Kathleen Eddington, Brian Davis, and Coleen Cline – provided letters 
supporting Eddington prior to that hearing.  (See attachments to PSI.)  Therefore, in 
making its sentencing decision, the trial court was not deprived of the favorable views 
those witnesses had of Eddington.   
                                                          
2  As explained by the district court, Eddington also alleged that, during the sentencing 
hearing, his trial counsel was ineffective by (1) failing to adequately cross-examine the 
state’s witnesses, (2) failing to object to irrelevant or inaccurate testimony, and (3) 
making a negative closing sentencing argument.  (R., p.344.)  The district court’s 
Memorandum Decision and Order Granting Summary Dismissal (see R., pp.344-345 
(Appendix A)), adequately addresses these issues without the need for further 
comment.      
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 Although the two other non-witnesses did not provide letters to the sentencing 
court, their testimony would not have impacted the court’s sentencing decision at all.  
Assuming that Tore Beal-Gwartney, Eddington’s family law attorney, would have 
provided unfavorable information about Carrie Eddington (the victim) in regard to a 
contempt charge “filed against [her] and described [her] documented parental alienation 
attempts” (Appellant’s Brief, p.32), such information would not have mitigated the 
extremely serious criminal behavior Eddington exhibited when he broke into Carrie’s 
home during the night and woke her up at gunpoint saying he was going to kill her, then 
himself.   
Of similar insignificance is Eddington’s complaint that his trial counsel did not call 
Dr. Jeanine Stone, his treating physician, to testify about his depression and anxiety, 
and that counsel failed to present mitigating evidence of Eddington’s mental health 
challenges.  (Appellant’s Brief, p.33.)  Dr. Stone’s testimony would have added little to 
the information presented in Mountain States Counseling & Psychological Services’ 32-
page “Domestic Assault/Battery Risk Assessment & Psychological Evaluation” 
(hereinafter “Evaluation”) prepared by Dr. Michael Johnston at the request of both 
parties.3  (See 3/5/14 Evaluation, attached to PSI; see also R., p.111 (Tr., p.47, Ls.2-6).)  
According to the Evaluation, Eddington identified his problems as including depression 
and anxiety (id., p.3), and those (and other) mental health issues were addressed (id., 
pp.8-9), culminating with a DSM-5 diagnosis that Eddington suffered from “major 
depression, moderate (history of severe), with anxious distress,” and “persistent 
                                                          
3  The district court explained at the outset of the sentencing hearing that it had 
reviewed the evaluations appended to the presentence report, including the 
psychological evaluation performed by Dr. Johnston.  (R., p.100 (Tr., p.1, L.13 – p.2, 
L.15).)     
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depressive disorder (dysthymia), moderate, with anxious distress” (id., p.13 
(capitalization modified)).  
 Eddington has failed to show any error in the summary dismissal of this claim 
under the deficient performance and prejudice prongs of Strickland v. Washington, 466 
U.S. 668, 687-688 (1984).  
 
2. Trial Counsel’s Failure To Become Familiar With The Facts Of The Case  
 Eddington contends the district court erred in summarily dismissing his claim that 
his trial counsel was ineffective by being unprepared in the following three ways: (1) 
refusing to listen to audio recordings of the initial police interviews of Carrie Eddington in 
which she made several sympathetic statements about Eddington, (2) failing “to obtain 
and review the 2011 custody deposition that clearly described Mr. and Ms. Eddington’s 
failed reconciliation attempt and Mr. Eddington’s legitimate access to Ms. Eddington’s 
house during that time[,]” and (3) failing to research Eddington’s “mental health issues 
and using this information to mitigate [Eddington’s] actions.”  (Appellant’s Brief, pp.35-
37.)   
In summarily dismissing Eddington’s three-part claim, the district court explained, 
“In this contention, Petitioner reiterates previously cited ‘sentencing errors’ he attributes 
to trial counsel, as well as what he claims was counsel’s insufficient investigation of the 
police audios of interviews with the victim.”  (R., p.345.)  The court did not need to 
repeat its determination that Eddington failed to show prejudice because he failed to 
demonstrate that, absent the claimed errors, the result of his sentencing hearing would 
have been different in regard to his reiterated “sentencing errors” claims.  (See R, 
pp.345-346; § C-1, supra.)   
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Eddington argues that the alleged failure of his trial counsel to review the audio 
recordings of Carrie Eddington’s initial police interviews constituted ineffective 
assistance because she made several statements sympathetic to Eddington, such as 
his need for help, that she felt bad because Eddington’s wife was pregnant, and that he 
is generally a good person.  (Appellant’s Brief, p.36.)  However, Carrie’s statements 
were made in the aftermath of Eddington’s frightening and malevolent crimes, while she 
“was extremely upset and unable to stand still[,]” pacing back and forth on the floor and 
too upset to even give a written statement.  (PSI, attached Meridian P.D. Narrative 
Report of Cpl. Mark Ford, DR#2013-4641, p.2.)  That Carrie made sympathetic 
comments about Eddington at that vulnerable time does not lessen Eddington’s 
culpability for his actions in any way, especially in contrast to Carrie’s more considered 
comments at the sentencing hearing.  (See R., pp.101-103 (Tr., p.6, L.1 – p.14, L.21).)  
Based on the district court’s ruling (see R., p.345-346) and the above comments, 
Eddington has failed to show any error in the summary dismissal of his claim that his 
trial counsel was ineffective for failing “to fully familiarize himself with the discovery/ 
facts of the case” (R., p.43).   
 
3. The District Court Correctly Denied Eddington’s Motion For Summary 
Disposition And His Request For An Evidentiary Hearing 
 
Eddington may be arguing that because the state did not present any evidence to 
controvert his claims, he is entitled to summary disposition in his favor.  (See 
Appellant’s Brief, p.48.) There is simply no such rule.  To the contrary, as explained by 
the district court: 
Like a plaintiff in a civil action, a petitioner seeking post-conviction relief 
must bear the burden of proving the allegations upon which Petitioner for 
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post-conviction relief is based by a preponderance of the evidence.  I.C.R. 
57(c); Grube v. State, 134 Idaho 24, 27, 995 P.2d 794, 797 (2000).  . . .  
 
 Summary dismissal of a petition for post-conviction relief is 
appropriate if “the petitioner has not presented evidence establishing a 
prima facie case as to each element of the claims upon which the 
applicant bears the burden of proof.”  [Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 583, 
6 P.3d 831, 833 (2000).]  . . . “Summary dismissal of an application for 
post-conviction relief may be appropriate, however, even where the state 
does not controvert the applicant’s evidence because the court is not 
required to accept either the applicant’s mere conclusory allegations, 
unsupported by admissible evidence, or the applicant’s conclusions of 
law.”  Frank-Teel v. State, 143 Idaho 664, 668, 152 P.3d 25, 29 (Ct. App. 
2006). 
 
(R., p.333.)  Regardless of whether the state presented any evidence, Eddington had 
the burden of presenting a prima facie case supporting each allegation of his post-
conviction claims.    
Moreover, because the district court properly granted the state’s motion for 
summary dismissal, Eddington can claim no error in the court’s decision to not grant his 
motion for summary disposition or its refusal to grant him an evidentiary hearing. 
      
CONCLUSION 
 The state respectfully requests this Court affirm the district court’s order 
summarily dismissing Eddington’s petition for post-conviction relief.  
 DATED this 18th day of January, 2017. 
 
 
      _/s/ John C. McKinney______ 
      JOHN C. McKINNEY 
      Deputy Attorney General 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
 
 I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 18th day of January, 2017, I caused two true 
and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to be placed in the 
United States mail, postage prepaid, addressed to: 
 
 ELLEN N. SMITH 
 SMITH HORRAS, P.A. 
 5561 N. GLENWOOD ST.  
 BOISE, ID  83714 
 
 
      __/s/ John C. McKinney_______ 
      JOHN C. McKINNEY    
      Deputy Attorney General 
JCM/dd 
 
 
